State Utah v. Vao Boyd Hunsaker : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
State Utah v. Vao Boyd Hunsaker : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kris C. Leonard; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Attorney for
Appellee.
Michael D. Bouwhuis; Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Hunsaker, No. 960234 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/169
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
DOCKET NO. CWpO^-CK 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
VAO BOYD HUNSAKER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960234-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM SENTENCING ON A PLEA IN 
ABEYANCE FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, A VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 76-5-103, IN 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE BEN H. 
HADFIELD PRESIDING. 
KRIS C. LEONARD (4902) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
PO Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS (6498) 
Attorney for Appellant 
2568 Washington Blvd #102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
, FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JAN fl 6 1997 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
VAO BOYD HUNSAKER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
KRIS C. LEONARD (4902) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
PO Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
Case No. 960234-CA 
Priority No. 2 
MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS (6498) 
Attorney for Appellant 
2568 Washington Blvd #102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM SENTENCING ON A PLEA IN 
ABEYANCE FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, A VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 76-5-103, IN 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE BEN H. 
HADFIELD PRESIDING. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED INTO AND 
ACCEPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE 
ENFORCED PURSUANT TO THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE STATUTE . . . . 1 
II. WHILE DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO TREAT HIS APPEAL AS INTERLOCUTORY 
MAY BE UNUSUAL, THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY DEALT WITH UNUSUAL 
SITUATIONS BY MAKING UNUSUAL DISPOSITIONS 1 
III. IMPOSITION OF A FINE WAS PLAIN ERROR 3 
IV. THE TERM "SENTENCE" DOES NOT REFER TO "PRISON SENTENCE," AS 
THE STATUTE DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FELONIES AND 
MISDEMEANORS CONCERNING SENTENCING 3 
CONCLUSION 5 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
State v. Dietz. (unpublished memorandum decision, 
September 6, 1996, Case No. 950769-CA) 2 
State v. Ford. 793 P.2d 397, 405 (Utah App. 1990) 2 
Utah Code Annotated 
Section 77-2a-2(4)(b) 4 
Section 77-2a-2(5) 4 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960234-CA 
vs. : 
VAO BOYD HUNSAKER, 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED INTO AND ACCEPTED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE ENFORCED PURSUANT 
TO THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE STATUTE. 
Appellee argues that if the defendant was not happy with the 
sentencing he was free to withdraw his guilty plea, but made no 
effort to do so. While it is true that defendant could have moved 
to withdraw his plea, it is also true that a plea in abeyance 
agreement had been entered into and accepted by the trial court. 
It is submitted that defendant was also free to stand by the plea 
in abeyance agreement and have it enforced pursuant to the plea 
in abeyance statute. This is in fact what the defendant has 
attempted to do. The trial court, on the other hand, was not free 
to ignore the statute. 
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II. WHILE DEFENDANTS REQUEST TO TREAT HIS APPEAL AS INTERLOCUTORY 
MAY BE UNUSUAL, THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY DEALT WITH UNUSUAL 
SITUATIONS BY MAKING UNUSUAL DISPOSITIONS. 
It is true that defendant's request to this Court, to treat 
his appeal as interlocutory if it determines that the trial court's 
order was not final, is unusual. However, this Court has dealt 
with unusual cases before. In the case of State v. Dietz, 
(unpublished memorandum decision, September 6, 1996, Case No. 
9507 69-CA), this Court stated that 
the unusual posture of this case prompts us to make an 
unusual disposition, but one that is appropriate under 
the circumstances. Cf. State v. Ford. 793 P.2d 397, 405 
(Utah App. 1990) (f,Given this imperfect state of affairs 
and the highly unusual posture of this case, we believe 
justice requires a remedy which is itself unusual."). 
This case is indeed unusual. It would be a surprise if we 
were to find a case in Utah where a defendant has been lawfully 
incarcerated pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement whereby the 
charge would ultimately be dismissed if the defendant complied with 
all conditions. 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal twenty three days after 
entry of the trial court's order, not thirty five days after and 
not eight months after, as appellee has attempted to argue. 
Defendant was only three days late for filing a petition for 
permission to appeal an interlocutory order. The interests of 
justice would not be served in this case if this court refused to 
examine this case on its merits merely because the notice of 
appeal, while filed within the time limit for appeals of final 
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orders, was filed a mere three days late for an interlocutory 
appeal. 
The unusual posture of this case and the interests of justice 
warrant this Court making an unusual disposition. 
III. IMPOSITION OF A FINE WAS PLAIN ERROR. 
Concerning imposition of the fine on defendant, apparently 
there was a miscommunication between counsel and the trial court at 
the sentencing hearing. However, there can be no doubt that if the 
trial court had given even a cursory look at the statute it would 
have been plain that a fine was not allowed under the statute. It 
is therefore submitted that it was plain error for the trial court 
to impose a fine upon defendant, no matter what counsel may or may 
not have said in court. While the amount of the administrative fee 
levied on the defendant can legally be the same amount as any fine 
that could have been imposed, the defendant cannot be fined. The 
court can only impose an administrative fee. While this error 
could have been corrected simply by calling it an administrative 
fee, the exchange between counsel and the trial court illustrates 
the court's lack of understanding of, or even the desire to 
understand the plea in abeyance statute. Imposing a fine on 
defendant was plain error. 
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IV. THE TERM "SENTENCE" DOES NOT REFER TO "PRISON SENTENCE," AS 
THE STATUTE DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FELONIES AND 
MISDEMEANORS CONCERNING SENTENCING. 
Appellee argues, inter alia, that the trial court didn't 
sentence defendant because it did not send him to prison. The 
trial court attempted to make this argument below, but evidently 
believed the argument to be weak, as indicated by its lack of 
response to counsel's retort. Counsel argued: 
If we construe this subsection E as liberally as I think 
the State would have the court do, then the court could 
do what the State says here, impose any conditions upon 
imposition of sentencing. The reason that doesn't make 
sense to me is because if you can impose anything you can 
do upon a conviction and sentencing, then it is 
sentencing. We just call it something else. 
THE COURT: Except as a condition of probation. In other 
words, one of the things you can't do is send someone to 
prison. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: That's correct. However, if we read the 
statute carefully, the statute doesn't distinguish 
between misdemeanors and felonies. 
(R. at 40) In fact the legislature demonstrated in the statute 
that it is cognizant of the difference between felonies and 
misdemeanors by according some differing treatment to each. For 
example, section 77-2a-2(4) (b) requires that for felonies the plea 
in abeyance must be in writing. Further, section 77-2a-2(5) 
states: 
A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer 
than 18 months if the plea was to any class of 
misdemeanor or longer than three years if the plea was to 
any degree of felony or to any combination of 
misdemeanors and felonies. 
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Those are the only two portions of the statute which address any 
distinction between misdemeanors and felonies, and nowhere does it 
state that "sentencing" means "prison." Clearly, a defendant who 
enters a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor charge (pursuant to a plea 
in abeyance agreement or otherwise) could never be sent to prison, 
though he could be sent to jail if he violated the agreement. The 
statute states that there is to be no conviction and no sentencing, 
and does not distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors. The 
argument was specious below and it remains so here. 
No matter how the State chooses to label it, the trial court 
sentenced the defendant, in violation of the plea in abeyance 
statute. 
CONCLUSION 
The plea in abeyance agreement in this case was entered into 
and accepted by the trial court, and should therefore be enforced 
pursuant to the plea in abeyance statute. While the defendant 
should not have been sentenced, the imposition of a fine and 
incarceration did in fact constitute a sentence, regardless of the 
label the State chooses to put on it. The fact that the trial 
court did not sentence defendant to prison is of no consequence, as 
the term "sentence" does not mean "prison sentence." The plea in 
abeyance statute does not distinguish between felonies and 
misdemeanors regarding sentencing. 
Wherefore, defendant respectfully prays that this Court will 
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remand his case for the proper imposition of conditions in 
accordance with the law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7~ day of January 1997, 
MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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